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Running Aground on the (Shoal) "Waters
of the United States": The Supreme Court
Invalidates the Migratory Bird Rule
Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
ofEngineers1
I. INTRODUCTION
For the better part of the last fifty years, the Commerce Clause2 provided a
safe harbor for congressional legislation. Finding a connection between a
regulated activity and interstate commerce meant smooth sailing through the
federal courts. Moreover, failure to find such a connection was not fatal, as the
courts often provided one. Congress took advantage ofthese fair seas and passed
a host of legislation regulating commercial, social, and criminal activities?
Among these statutes was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,"
popularlyknown as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Like many statutes based
on the Commerce Clause, the constitutionality of the CWA was tested and
upheld. 5
However, the legislative landscape began to change with the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.6 For the first time in nearly sixty
years, an act of Congress was invalidated as exceeding the authority granted to
Congress by the Commerce Clause. As courts applied the stricter standard
announced in Lopez, some regulations began to founder under the newly-
heightened scrutiny. Among the regulations that struggled in these rough waters
was 33 C.F.R. § 328.3, the United States Army Corps of Engineers's ("Corps's")
definition of "waters of the United States." In United States v. Wilson,7 the
Fourth Circuitheld that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 exceeded the statutory authority of the
CWAinorderto avoid raising constitutional questions.' Against this background,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook
1. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
2. U.S. CONS. art. I, § 8, cL 3.
3. See infira notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 896 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
5. United States v. RiversideBayviewHomes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896
F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
8. Id. at257.
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County v. United States Army Corps ofEngineers' a case considering whether
a series of rain-filled gravel mines qualified as "waters of the United States"
under the CWA and the Corps's Migratory Bird Rule."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC") was
formedby twenty-three suburban Chicago cities and villages to locate and develop
a disposal site for nonhazardous baled waste." The Chicago Gravel Company
informed SWANCC of the availability of a 533-acre parcel bordering Cook and
Kane counties in Illinois." This site had been used for gravel and sand mining for
three decades, but it was closed around 1960.13 The abandoned site developed
into a "successional stage forest," and the excavation trenches evolved into a
group of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size and depth.14 SWANCC
bought the site for disposal of solid nonhazardous baled waste. 5
SWANCC filed forpermits, as required bylocal law, with Cook County and
the State of Illinois.' 6 In March of 1986, SWANCC contacted the Corps to
determine if § 404(a) of the CWAP required that SWANCC obtain a federal
dredge and fill permit prior to filling some of the permanent and seasonal ponds."8
The Corps concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the site did not contain
wetlands or areas that supported vegetation adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. However, members of the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission
observed a number of migratory bird species at the site.2" Upon receiving notice
of these observations, the Corps reconsidered its conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction.21 Subsequently, the Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site pursuant
to subpart (b) of the Migratory Bird Rule.Y2
9. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
10. Id. at 162.
11. Id. at 162-63.





17. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
18. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 163.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. In 1986, the Corps attempted to define and clarify the reach of its
jurisdiction under § 404(a) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA'). The Corps stated its
[Vol. 66
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The Corps discerned thatpeople had observed approximately 121 species of
migratory birds at the siteO Based on this finding, on November 16, 1987, the
Corps determined that seasonally-ponded areas of the site qualified as waters of
the United States. 24 The Corps made this determination because "(1) theproposed
site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) the water areas and
spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the water areas are used as
habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines."
While permits were pending, SWANCC made proposals to decrease the
displacement of migratory birds at the disposal site. 6 SWANCC acquired
approval from all necessary local and state agencies." By 1993, SWANCC
secured "a special use planned development permit from the Cook County Board
of Appeals, a landfill development permit from the Illinois Environmental
ProtectionAgency, and approvalfromthe Illinois Department ofConservation."
However, the Corps refused to issue a § 404(a) permit." The Corps found that
SWANCC's proposalwas notthe least environmentally damaging alternative, that
it posed an unacceptable risk to the local drinking water supply, and that the
project would have an unmitigated impact on area-sensitive species.3"
SWANCC filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois challenging both thejurisdiction of the Corps and the merits of
its denial of the § 404(a) permit3 The district court granted the Corps's motion
jurisdiction extended to intrastate waters:
a. Which are orwould be used as habitat by birds protected byMigratory Bird
Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13,1986). This statementhas been called the"MigratoryBirdRule." Solid
Waste, 531 U.S. at 164.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 164-65 (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Chicago Dist., Dep't of
Army Permit Evaluation and Decision Document, Lodging of Petitioner, Tab. No. 1, p.
6) (correction in original).
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for summary judgment on the jurisdictional issue.32 SWANCC dropped its
challenge to the permit denial and appealed the jurisdictional issue to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.3 On appeal, SWANCC attacked
the Corps's use of the Migratory Bird Rule to assert jurisdiction." SWANCC
argued that the Corps "exceeded [its] statutory authority in interpreting the CWA
to cover nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters based upon the presence of
migratory birds and, in the alternative, that Congress lacked the power under the
Commerce Clause to grant such regulatoryjurisdiction."35
The court of appeals first considered the constitutional question-whether
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause-and held that the
"cumulative impact" doctrine gave Congress the authority to regulate such
waters.36 The court found that the destruction of the natural habitats of migratory
birds had a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce because "each year
millions of Americans cross state lines and spend over a billion dollars to hunt and
observe migratory birds.' The court then turned to the regulatory issue, holding
that "the CWA reached as many waters as the Commerce Clause allows."'" As
a result of holding that the Migratory Bird Rule was permissible under the
Commerce Clause, the court also held that the Migratory Bird Rule was a
reasonable interpretation of the CWA.' 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari andreversed.4" In afive-
to-four decision, 41 the Court held that, as applied to SWANCC's balefill site, the
Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the authority granted to the Corps under § 404(a)
of the CWA. 42 The Court stated that the Corps's application of its regulations
raised serious constitutional questions. 43 However, because the Court could not
find a clear indication from Congress that it intended § 404(a) of the CWA to




35. Id. at 165-66.
36. Id. at 166. The cumulative impact doctrine states that a single activity that has
no discemable effect on interstate commerce may be regulated if the aggregate effect of





41. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 161. He was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
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significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps's]
interpretation." Thus, the Court avoided the Commerce Clause issue.'
11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Migratory Bird Rde
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, water pollution become a major national
concern-. Congress, in an attempt to address these concerns, passed the CWAto
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."47 The CWA, in § 404(a), gives the Corps the authority to grant
permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters."
Section 404(a) also gives the Corps, in conjunction with the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), the ability to establish guidelines to specify the
criteria under which a permit may be granted.49 The CWA defined the term
"navigable waters" to mean "waters of the United States.!"5 However, the CWA
didnot define "waters of the United States." Faced withthis ambiguous definition,
the Corps initially construed the CWA to apply only to waters that were actually
navigable.5 This definition proved overly restrictive, and, in 1975, the Corps
redefined "waters of the United States"to includenavigable waters, non-navigable
interstate waters and their tributaries, intrastate waters whose use or destruction
could affect interstate commerce, and wetlands adjacent to waters of the United
States.52
The Corps's definition of "waters of the United States" faced constitutional
challenge in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.53 In Riverside
Bayview,the Corps sought to enjoin aproperty developer fromplacing fill material
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Jonathan I-. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Afenace of Mr. Wilson:
Commerce Jurisprudence and the Limits ofFederal WetlandRegulation, 29 ENvI. L.
1,24 (1999).
47. 33 US.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
49. David P. Littell & William E. Taylor, Wetland Permitting in Maine, 12 ME.
B.J. 274,275 (1997).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
51. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e)(1) (repealed 1977)). "Itis thewater
body's capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce which
is the determinative factor." 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e)(1) (repealed 1977).
52. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2000).
53. 474 U.S. 121, 123-33 (1985).
2001]
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on "80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in
Macomb County, Michigan.' 54 The district court granted an injunction, and the
developer appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 5 The Sixth Circuit reversed and held that
the land was not subject to the Corps's jurisdiction because it was not subject to
flooding by the adj acent navigable water "at a frequency sufficient to support the
growth of aquatic vegetation."56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The Court determined
that the Corps's action did not amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment,"8
and that its decision to include adjacent wetlands in its definition of "waters of the
United States" was reasonable.5 The Court declared that "[t]he evident breadth
of congressional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems
suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term 'waters' to
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined." '
Because wetlands may drain into adjacent waters and serve to filter and purify
those waters, the Court could not "say that the Corps' conclusion... [was]
unreasonable." ' Nevertheless, the Court specifically did not address the question
whether § 404(a) or the Commerce Clause would allow the Corps to assert
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands.62
In 1986, the Corps adopted what has become known as the Migratory Bird
Rule,63 which asserted jurisdiction over wetlands not adjacent to navigable
waters.' The rule extended the Corps's jurisdiction to the following waters: (1)
those used as habitat by birds protected by migratory bird treaties; (2) those used
by other migratory birds that cross state lines; (3) those used by endangered
species; and (4) those used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. Prior
to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lopez, the validity of the Migratory
54. Id. at 124.
55. Id. at 125.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 129.
59. Id. at 133.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 134.
62. David A Linehan, Endangered Regulation: IWhy the Commerce Clause May
No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2
TEx. REv. L. & POL. 365, 385 (1998).
63. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
64. Timothy S. Bishop et al., One for the Birds: The Corps of Engineers'
"Migratory BirdRule ", 30 ENvTL. L. REP. 10633 (2000).
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Bird Rule was considered by the Fourth,' Seventh,' and Ninth Circuits. The
Fourth Circuit invalidated the rule because it was not passed in compliance with
notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act.'
However, both the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,70 and the
Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt Co. v. UnitedStatesn held that the jurisdiction of the
Corps could reach local waters because of use of the waters by migratory birds.'
These decisions were based, in part, on an expansive reading of the Commerce
Clause.' Nevertheless, recent trends in Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggest
that future Supreme Court decisions may give the Commerce Clause a more
restrictive reading! 4
B. The Commerce Clause from Gibbons to Morrison
The constitutional basis for the CWA, and other federal environmental laws,
was Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce." The Commerce Clause
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."76 Although the Clause has
limits, formore thanhalfa century, itlhas been interpreted to grant Congress near-
plenarypower.' However, since the Supreme Court's decisioninLopez, therehas
been "speculation as to the continued viability of a host of federal regulatory
schemes." 8
66. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, No. 89-2905,1989 WL 106990, at *1-2 (4th
Cir. Sept. 19, 1989).
67. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 260-63 (7th Cir. 1993).
68. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 357-61 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
69. Tabb Lakes, 1989 WL 106990, at *2. The Fourth Circuit also would consider
the scope of the Corps's jurisdiction under the CWA in a post-Lopez decision. See
United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-60 (4th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of
Wilson, see infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text
70. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
71. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991).
72. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 260-61; Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
73. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 263 (Manion, J., concurring); Leslie Salt, 896
F.2d at 360-61.
74. Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on
EnvironmentalRegulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 321, 341-55 (1997).
75. Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulation in a Post-Lopez
World: Some Questions andAnswers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980 (2000).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
77. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text
78. Linehan, supra note 62, at 366.
2001]
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The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden.9 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated that all
the powers set forth in Article I of the United States Constitution are complete in
themselves and may be exercised to their utmost extent.8" The Court cautioned,
however, that this power is limited by the express terms of Article I.81 Congress
cannot regulate non-commercial activities or commerce only affecting one state.'
Under Gibbons, it was not enough for an activity to affect commerce; Congress
could "only regulate those activities which canbeproperly termed'commerce. 'I
After Gibbons, the Court did nothave many opportunities to rule onthe scope
of the commerce power, and it was not until 1870 that the Court invalidated a
federal law for exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause authority.U Eventually,
the Court determined that some intrastate activities affected interstate commerce
to such an extent that federal regulation was justified.1 This belief reached its
peak during the New Deal era inthe landmark case ofNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.," in which the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act.' The
Court held that, when industries organize themselves on a national scale, "making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities," they
open up their industrial labor relations to congressional regulation. Rather than
ask whether the regulated activity was commerce, the Court focused on whether
the activity substantially affected commercial activity.' Because Jones &
Laughlin was a large national steel producer with thousands of employees, one
could argue that labor strife there could affect interstate commerce."
Nevertheless, Jones & Laughlin effectively "marked the end of the Court's
restraint on congressional assertion of power under [the Commerce Clause]." '
Following Jones & Laughlin, the Court found that Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause was nearly limitless. This point was driven home in
79. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
80. Id. at 196.
81. Id. at 196-97.
82. Adler, supra note 46, at 8.
83. Linehan, supra note 62, at 372.
84. Adler, supra note 46, at 8 (citing United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41,
42-45 (1870)).
85. Warner, supra note 74, at 327.
86. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 41.
89. Id. at 37.
90. Adler, supra note 46, at 9.
91. Adler, supra note 46, at 9.
[Vol. 66
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Wickard v. Filburn,92 in which the Court upheld the conviction of a farmer for
growing wheatforpersonal consumption.' Althoughthe Courtrecognizedthatthe
farmer's growing wheat for his family had little, if any, effect on interstate
commerce, itreasoned that, ifthousands of other farmers also grew wheat for their
families, there could be a substantial impact on commerce." The Court statedthat
apurely local and non-commercial activity could "whatever its nature, bereached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."
The Wickard decision made it clear that the Commerce Clause, despite its
textual language, did not limit Congress's regulatory powers to interstate
commerce.9 Although the Court has continued to "nominally review"
congressional regulations of commerce, it effectively "rubber stamped"
congressional acts that could affect comerce.' For example, the Court upheld
civil rights laws,' criminal statutes, environmental regulationsC ' and minimum
wage laws as applicable to state government employees,' as regulations of
interstate commerce. The Court held that it should "defer to a congressional
finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce.""m  This highly
deferential review led one federal judge to make a lighthearted suggestion that it
would be appropriate to rename the Commerce Clause the "Hey, you can do
whatever you feel like Clause.""r
92. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
93. Id. at 128-29.
94. Id. at 127-28.
95. Id. at 125.
96. Linehan, supra note 62, at 378.
97. Linehan, supra note 62, at 379.
98. Katzenbachv. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,295-305 (1964) (upholding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a local barbeque restaurant despite the fact that there
was no evidence that the restaurant served interstate travelers); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250-62 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as applied to a local motel adjacent to an interstate highway).
99. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150-57 (1971) (upholding a federal
conviction for extortion under the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, despite the
fact there was no evidence that the defendant's conduct had any interstate commerce
effects).
100. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,303-05
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and ReclamationAct despite the argument
that it regulates land use, which is a loal matter).
101. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985)
(applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to state gove nent employees).
102. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275.
103. AlexKozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. &PUB.PoL'Y
1, 5 (1995) (Judge Kozinski has served on the United States Court of Appeals for the
2001]
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The Court drastically altered its course in Lopez, a 1995 case striking down
the Gun Free School Zones Act.' Lopez marked the first time in more than fifty
years that the Court struck down a federal regulation because it exceeded
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause."° Chief Justice Rehnquist
authored the majority opinion and stressed that "the constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers."' The Court delineated three categories of
activities that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. °'7 First, Congress
can regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.0 Second, Congress
can protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce from all "threats," even
those coming from purely intrastate activities."° Third and finally, Congress can
regulate activities that have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.' 10
According to the Court, mere possession of a gun in a school zone failed to meet
any ofthese tests."' The Court refused to consider the aggregate effect of guns in
school zones because it determined that gun possession was not a commercial
activity.1 2
After Lopez, several circuit courts addressed how the decision applied to
environmental regulations. In Wilson, the Fourth Circuit questioned the
constitutionality of the Corps's definition of "waters of the United States" found
in 33 C.F.R § 328.3(a)(3)."' Because the regulation covered waters that "could
affect interstate or foreign commerce," the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Ninth Circuit since 1985.).
104. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
105. Gerhardt, supra note 75, at 10980.
106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
107. Id. at 558.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 558-59.
111. Id. at 567.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257-59 (4th Cir. 1997). The
regulation defines waters of the United States as including: "[a]ll other waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993). This regulationwas initially adopted in 1975 to expand the
Corps's jurisdiction to waters that were not actually navigable and was clarified in 1986
by the Migratory Bird Rule. The Fourth Circuit did not consider the application of the
Migratoiy Bird Rule because it previously had held that the Migratory Bird Rule was
invalid because it was implemented without using notice and comment rulemaking as
required by the Administrative Procedures Act. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States,
No. 89-2905, 1989 WL 106990, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1989).
[Vol. 66
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regulation probably did notmeettthe Lopez test, as it required neither a substantial
effect on commerce nor a nexus with navigable (or even interstate) waters."'
Noting that the definition was contained in an agency regulation rather than a
statute, the Fourth Circuit avoided the constitutional issue by invalidating the
regulation as exceeding its congressional authorization under the CWA.1IS
W'ildlife protection laws, however, have faired better after Lopez."I In United
States v. Bramble,"7 the Ninth Circuit upheld the Eagle Protection Act under the
Commerce Clause."' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that both possession of and
commerce in eagle parts have substantial effects on interstate commerce because
they threaten the eagle with extinction." In NationalAss 'n ofHome Budlders v.
Babbitt,120 the D.C. Circuit upheld the Endangered Species Act's ("ESA's")
prohibition against the taking of endangered species as applied to the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly.'' The D.C. Circuitheldthattheprovision against taking was
justified "as a necessary aid to the prohibitions in the ESA on transporting and
selling endangered species in interstate commerce."' The D.C. Circuit cited
Bramble and stated that the risk of extinction substantially affects interstate
comnerce."
3
As lower courts struggled to apply Lopez, it became apparent that the Court
had left several questions unanswered about how to apply its analysis.2 The
Lopez Court noted that Congress had not provided any findings concerning a link
114. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
115. Id. The Supreme Court took an identical approach in Solid Waste. See infra
notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
116. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). The
Author mentions federal wildlife protection laws because their relationship to interstate
commerce is similar to that ofthe MigratoryBirdRule. Wildlifeprotectionlawspreserve
the possibility "of interstate commerce in these species and of interstate movement of
persons, suchas amateur students of nature or professional scientists who come to a state
to observe and study these species." Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471
F. Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996).
118. Id. at 1481.
119. Id. "Extinction... would... forclos[e] any possibility of several types of
commercial activity: future commerce in eagles or their parts; future interstate travel for
the purpose of observing or studying eagles; or future commerce in beneficial products
derived either from eagles or from analysis of their genetic material." Id.
120. 130 F.3d 1041 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
121. Id. at 1043.
122. Id. at 1046-47.
123. Id. at 1054.
124. Gerhardt, supra note 75, at 10980.
2001]
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between guns in school zones and interstate commerce." The absence of a
jurisdictional element "which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce" also troubled the
Court,26 Would the Court deferto congressional findings in subsequent decisions?
Would a jurisdictional element allow future legislation to pass constitutional
muster? The Court addressed these questions in United States v. Morrison."
In Morrison, the Court concluded that Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to enact the civil remedy section of the Violence Against Women Act,
42 U.S.C. § 13981.128 Although the Violence Against Women Act, like the Gun
Free School Zones Act, did not contain a jurisdictional element," 9 the Court
indicated that the presence of ajurisdictional element merely would "lend support
to the argument that § 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce."13
However, unlike the Gun Free School Zones Act, the Violence Against Women
Act was "supported by numerous findings."'3 Despite these findings, the Court
struck down the Act, stating "the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation."'132
In Morrison, the Court sent a strong signal that "even under our modem
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress' regulatory authority
is not without effective bounds.' 33 It reemphasized that Commerce Clause
regulations must focus on commerce--"thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature."' 34 While not overruling Commerce Clause
precedent, the Rehnquist Courthighlighted the limiting language in these decisions
and refused to extend them to "effects on interstate commerce so indirect and
remote."' 35 This retreat from the strong cumulative effects test essential to
Wickard and its progeny has caused great speculation and concern in
environmental law, "the field in which Congress arguably most frequently resorts
125. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
126. Id. at 561.
127. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
128. Id. at 602.
129. Id. at 613.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 614.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 608.
134. Id. at 613.
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to the Commerce Clause Power."" It is against this backdrop that the Supreme
Courtgranted certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of the Migratory
Bird Rule. .
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held that 33 C.FR. § 328.3(a)(3), as
appliedto SWANCC's balefill site pursuantto the Migratory Bird Rule, exceeded
the statutory authority granted to the Corps under § 404(a) of the CWAY The
Court reached this conclusion, in part, because of the serious constitutional
questions that would be raised by the application of the CWA to an "abandoned
sand and gravel pit"" The Court feared that "[p]ermitting respondents to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird
Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use." ''
First, the Court noted that this was not the first time it had considered the
scope of § 404(a).4° The Court held in Riverside Bayview that the Corps could
assert jurisdiction over wetlands that abutted navigable waters because Congress
intended to regulate some waters that would not be considered navigable under the
ordinary definition of the term.14 The Solid Waste Court pointed out that the
holding was based on Congress's approval of the Corps's regulations interpreting
the CWA to cover such wetlands, and the belief that Congress's concern for water
quality and protection of aquatic ecosystems indicated the intent to reach waters
that were adjacent to waters of the United States. 4 The Court then emphasized
that the Riverside Bayview Court did not consider whether the Corps could
regulate the discharge of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to
navigable waters. 143
Next, the Court looked at the Corps's original interpretation of the CWAM"
In 1974, the Corps defined the term navigable waters and emphasized that the
136. Gerhardt, supra note 75, at 10980.
137. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 175 (2001).
138. Id.
139. Id.




144. Id. at 168.
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water body's capability for use for transportation or commerce is the key factor. 145
While this definition was inconsistent with the Corps's position, the Corps did not
argue that it mistook Congress's intent in 1974.146 Instead, the Corps argued that
Congress implicitly approved of the Corps's more expansive 1977 definition of
navigable waters.147 Congress had the opportunity to overrule the Corps's 1977
interpretation through legislation but failed to do so."4 The Court dismissed this
argument stating that "[flailed legislative proposals are a 'particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute."' 149 Moreover, the
failure of the 1977 House Bill could not have shown Congress's agreement with
the Migratory Bird Rule, which was not adopted until 1986.150 Further, the Court
noted that the Corps could not point to any evidence "that the House bill was
proposed in response to the Corps's claim of jurisdiction over nonnavigable,
isolated, intrastate waters or that its failure indicated congressional acquiescence
to such jurisdiction." 1'
Next, the Court addressed the Corps's argument that the term "other...
waters" in § 404(g) incorporated the Corps's 1977 regulations. Section 404(g)
does not define "other... waters," and the Court found that it is possible Congress
only wanted to include waters adjacent to navigable waters."' Regardless, the
Court held there was no need to determine the meaning of § 404(g) conclusively
and stated that it was enough to point out that § 404(g) did not conclusively
determine the definition of "waters" elsewhere in the Act.
1 54
Finally, the Court considered the possibility that "Congress did not address
the precise question of § 404(a)'s scope with regard to nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters, and that, therefore, [the Court] should give deference to the
'Migratory Bird Rule.' 1 55 Although the Court found § 404(a) was clear, the




148. Id. at 169.
149. Id. at 169-70 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)).
150. Id. at 170.




155. Id. at 172.
156. In Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Court laid out a fiamework for dealing with an agency's interpretation of a
statute that it administers. IfCongress has spoken to the precise question, then the intent
of Congress is applied. Id. at 842. However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, then
[Vol. 66
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foundthattheigratory Bird Rule pm dittdfederalencroachment on atraditional
state power 58 and stretched the limits of Congress's Commerce Clausepowers.U2
Therefore, the rule raised "significant constitutional questions."" When an
administrativeinterpretationofastatuteraises significantconstitutional questions,
the Court requires a clear indication that Congress intended to reach that result
This requirement is based on the Court's desire to avoid unnecessarily deciding
constitutional questions.16 The Court found "nothing approaching a clear
statement from Congress that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and
gravel pit."" Therefore, it read the statute to avoid the constitutional questions
raised by the Migratory Bird Rule and rejected the Corps's request for Chevron
deference.16
the court should askwhether the agency's answer"is based ona permissible construction
of the statute." Id. at 843. This policy of deference has been the source of much debate
both among scholars and among the courts. Much of the discussion has concerned the
continuedvalidity ofthe doctrine. Solid Waste has implications in this debate and, atthe
time ofthis writing, has been cited several times for the position that, where the agency's
constructionwouldraise constitutional questions, the court should construe the statute to
avoid such questions. See Nehme v. Immigration& Naturalization Serv., 252 F.3d 415,
422 (5th Cir. 2001); John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Tallman, J., concurring); John, 247 F.3d at 1045-47 (Kozki, J., dissenting); Time
WarnerEntm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126,1131 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Collettev. St. Luke's
RooseveltHosp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 256,266 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Davis v. United States,
50 Fed. CL 192,205 (2001). This Note focuses onthe environmental law and commerce
clause implications of the Solid Waste decision and, for the purpose of brevity, does not
discuss the Chevron implications. For debate on the continued validity of Chevron, see
generally David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and JudicialDeference in the Post-
Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 387 (1997); Thomas J. Byrne, The Continuing
Confusion Over Chevron: Can the Nondelegation Doctrine Provide a (Partial)
Solution?, 30 SuffoLK U. L. REv. 715 (1997); Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron
Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of
Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 115 (1998); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of
JudicialDeference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALEJ. oNREG. 327 (2000); GregoryE.
Maggs,ReconcilingTextualism andthe ChevronDoctrine: InDefense ofJusticeScalia,
28 CONN. L. REv. 393 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WAsIL U. L.Q. 351 (1994).
157. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172.
158. Id. at 173.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 174.
161. Id. at 172.
162. Id.




Northrip: Northrip: Running Aground on the (Shoal) Waters of the United States:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001
MTSSOURILA WREVIEW
The dissent165 viewed the majority opinion as an "unfortunate step that
needlessly weakens our principal safeguard against toxic water." " It first
considered Riverside Bayview and argued that:
[o]ur broad finding inRiverside Bayview... applies equally to the 410-
acre parcel at issue here. Moreover, once Congress crossed the legal
watershed that separates navigable streams of commerce from marshes
and inland lakes, there is no principled reason for limiting the statute's
protection to those waters or wetlands that happen to lie near a
navigable stream.
167
The dissent then examined the history of federal water regulations and
contended that, although the initial goal of such regulations was to promote
commerce and transportation, during the mid-twentieth century, this goal gave
way to concerns about environmental degradation." This shift reached its peak
with the passage of the CWA in 1972.69 The CWA was the first truly
comprehensive water pollution law. 7 The dissent argued that § 404(a) was
principally a pollution control measure. 71 Although Congress retained the
jurisdictional term "navigable waters," it "broadened the definition of that term to
encompass all 'waters of the United States.""' Thus, the dissent argued, the
Court's focus on commerce and navigation ignored the fact that "Congress
intend[ed] that its assertion of federal jurisdiction be given the 'broadest possible
constitutional interpretation.""' Congress used the term "navigable waters" as
"shorthand for 'waters over which federal authoritymaypioperly be asserted."" 74
Next, the dissent addressed the majority's holding that the Corps initially
construed its jurisdiction under § 404(a) to be limited to "navigable waters."'7
The dissent noted that the reactions of Congress, the EPA, and the courts quickly
convinced the Corps that the "statute required it 'to protect water quality to the full
165. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. CoNF. REP.No. 92-1236, at 144
(1972)).
174. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 66
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extent of the [Clommerce [C]lause."'17 6, This ledto the expanded regulations that
were upheld in Riverside Bayview According to the 1977 version of these
regulations, the Corps's jurisdiction extended to "isolated lakes and wetlands,
intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part of a
tributary system to interstate waters ... of the United States, the degradation or
destruction of which could effect interstate commerce."'  These trends were
recognizedbymembers of Congress, and, in 1977, bills wereproposedthatwould
have limited the scope of the Corps's jurisdiction. 17  The dissent argued that the
failure of these bills constituted congressional endorsement of the expanded
regulations.' "Congress' rejection ofthe House's efforts in 1977 to cut back on
the Corps' 1975 assertion of jurisdiction clearly indicates congressional
acquiescence in that assertion..... The dissent asserted that the majority reached
its contrary conclusions through"selective reading."'" ""[lt is particularlyironic
for the Court to raise the specter of federalism while construing a statute that
makes explicit efforts to foster local control over water regulation."'"
Concluding that the Corps's interpretation was reasonable and, therefore,
entitled to deference under Chevron, the dissent turned to the question whether,
underthe Commerce Clause, Congress hadthepowertoregulatothebalefill site."
The dissent consideredthethree categories expressed inLopez and arguedthatthis
case concerned an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce." It
pointed out that, so long as an aggregated class of similar activities substantially
affected interstate commerce, an individual activity need not actually affect
cormerce.
196
The dissent arguedthat"the discharge offilmaterialinto theNation's waters
is almost always undertaken for economic reasons."" And such discharge, inthe
aggregate, adversely will impact the populations of migratory birds," and that
"[tihe causal connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of
176. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Regulatory Programs ofthe Corp of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,127
(July 19, 1977).
179. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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commercial activities associated with migratory bird . . . is direct and
concrete."' " The power to regulate commerce includes the ability to protect
natural resources, and migratory birds are such a resource."9 Next, the dissent
noted that, in Missouri v. Holland,' the protection of migratory birds was held
to be a national interest that only could be accomplished by national action.9 The




In Solid Waste, the Supreme Court held that the Migratory Bird Rule was an
unreasonable interpretation of the CWA. 94 The Court did not decide whether the
Corps's assertion of jurisdiction was permissible under the Commerce Clause.
However, the Court's discussion about the "serious constitutional questions"
presented by the case appears consistent with the recent Lopez and Morrison
decisions. The opinion leaves some unanswered questions concerning the scope
of the CWA and the decision's place in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
A. What is Left of the Migratory Bird Rule?
Although the Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, it did so as
specifically appliedto the petitioner's balefdll site. 95 However, the opinionimplies
that any assertion ofjurisdiction over isolated waters and wetlands solely because
of the presence of migratory birds would raise similar constitutional questions.'
Perhaps in anticipation of the Court's interpretation, the Corps asserted, in its
brief, that the regulated activity was a municipal landfill that is of a commercial
nature.'" However, the Court stated that this argument was a "far cry" from the
purpose ofthe CWA.'98 It is unlikelythat the Court would allow federal regulation
of isolated wetlands solely because of the presence of migratory birds.
189. Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
190. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
192. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Holland, 252 U.S.
at 433.
193. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 174.
195. Id. at 174.
196. Id.
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The Migratory Bird Rule protectedfourtypes ofisolated wetlands: (1)those
thatprovide ahabitatformigratorybirds protectedbytreaty, (2) those thatprovide
a habitat for migratory birds that cross state lines; (3) those that provide a habitat
for endangered species; and (4) those that are used to irrigate crops for sale in
interstate commerce.'" The Solid Waste opinion certainly eliminates the
protection of the first two categories. As endangered species have an interstate
commerce connection similar to that of migratory birds (ie., revenue-generating
recreational activities associated with the animals), the opinion, by implication,
covers the third category, as welL However, the fourth category of wetlands, those
that are used to irrigate crops that are sold in interstate commerce, may survive the
opinion.
It is unclear how the Court would react to the regulation ofisolated wetlands
if those wetlands were used for the irrigation of crops to be sold in interstate
commerce. The Court emphasized that the word "navigable" is in the statute for
a reason, and it could not adopt an approach that would give the term no effecet. 0
However, the irrigation of crops provides a closer and more tangible connection
to interstate commerce than is presented by the presence of migratory birds. The
Court emphasized that it was not setting the limits or defining the exact meaning
of the definition of "other waters" in § 404(g).01 Nevertheless, the Court
expressed great reluctance to extend the holding in Riverside Bayview to non-
adjacent wetlands.2° Given the Court's desire to protect the "States' traditional
and primary power over land and water use,"" it likely would be reluctant to
extend § 404(a) to isolated wetlands. However, considering the five-to-four split,
it is possible.that a case presenting a stronger constitutional argumentmight sway
one justice.
B. Impact on the Environmental Protection Agency's
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Program
Under the CWA, the EPA is authorized to regulate and issue permits for the
discharge ofpollutionfrom a "point source" into a "water ofthe United States." '
The EPA has defined waters of the United States very broadly.? Although Solid
199. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
200. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172.
201. Id. at 171.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 174.
204. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
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Waste dealt specifically with the Corps's definition, it may have implications for
the EPA's definition, as well. A January 19, 2001, EPA-Corps of Engineers
memorandum discussing the decision expressed the opinion that it applied with
equal force to National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permitting.20
6
The EPA's definition, for the most part, appears to be well within the limits
set by Solid Waste and Riverside Bayview, and, thus, would not present major
constitutional questions. Both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have
upheld the EPA's definition. 2°' However, subpart (c) of the definition extends to
"other waters... the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce."2 °" This portion of the definition
mirrors the Corps's definition ofwaters ofthe United States that the Fourth Circuit
questioned in Wilson.2' The Ninth Circuit, in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;"
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands," sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, ornaturalponds the use, degradation, or
destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters:
(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries
in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
definition;
(f) The territorial sea; and
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this definition.
40 C.F.R § 122.2 (2001).
206. Environmental Law Decision Notes, 2001-JUN ARMY LAw. 37, 41. The
memorandum expressed both the Environmental Protection Agency's and the Corps's
opinions that Solid Waste is "a limited decision having minimal impact on their 'broad'
jurisdictional authority under the CWA" Id.
207. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District, 243 F.3d 526, 533-34 (9th Cir.
2001); United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762,765 (2d Cir 1999).
208. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2001).
209. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Irrigation District,210 upheld subpart (c) of the EPA's definition and distinguished
Solid Waste because the irrigation canals at issue in Heaad;'aters were not
"isolated waters" because they leaked into natural streams and lakes.21 To the
extent that subpart (c) of the EPA's definition of waters of the United States
reaches isolated waters with no hydrological connection to navigable waters,
courts likely will follow Solid Waste and Wilson in order to strike down the
assertion of NPDES authority. To the extent a hydrological connection can be
established, courts will be free to follow Headwaters andRiverside Bayvie, and
to allow the EPA to enforce its NPDES permit authority.
C. WhatAbout Riverside Bayview?
The Court in Solid Waste endorsed the central holding ofRiverside Bayview
that the Corps can exercisejurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to "waters
of the United States." The rain-filled mines in Solid Waste were neither adjacent
nor connected to "waters of the United States," while the wetlands of Riverside
Bayview were adjacent. This gave the Court the ability to distinguish the cases.
Although Solid Waste is faithfil to the literal language ofRiverside BayvIew, it
represents a retreat from the expansive position taken by the Riverside Bayvew
Court
The different approaches can be seen in the dicta of the courts. While
Riverside Bayview emphasized that "the Act's definition of 'navigable waters' as
'the waters of the United States' makes it clear that the term 'navigable' ... is of
limited import,"21 2 Solid Waste stressed that it "is one thing to give a word limited
effect and quite another to give it no effect."' A more substantial difference
betweenthe cases is their approachto the 1977 legislative debates concerningthe
Corps's assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands. While the Solid Waste Court
refused to accept Congress's failure to act as an endorsement of the Corps's
interpretation, theRiversideBayview Courtheldthat "Congress acquiescedinthe
administrative constuction."214 Finally, while the Solid Waste Court declined to
apply Chevron deference, the Riverside Bayview followed a traditional Chevron
analysis.
As discussed, although Solid Waste and Riverside Bayview reached
consistent and reconcilable conclusions, the respective Courts used very different
210. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
211. Id. at 533.
212. United States v. Riverside BayviewHomes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
213. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 172 (2001).
214. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136.
215. Id. at 131.
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approaches. Their consistency is more a product of their starting points than their
analysis. 1 However, given the Court's reluctance to reverse its prior decisions,217
it is unlikelythe Court will overruleRiverside Bayview anytime in the near future.
Instead, the Court likely will draw a sharp line between adjacent and non-adjacent
waters usingRiverside Bayview to affirmregulations dealing with adjacent waters
and Solid Waste to strike down regulations dealing with non-adjacent waters. 18
D. Commerce Clause Issues
Solid Waste is also significant because of the role it plays in the Rehnquist
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court avoided the Commerce
Clause out of its "prudential desirenotto needlessly reach constitutional issues."219
While doing so, it commented onthe absence of"a clear statement from Congress
that it intended § 404(a) to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit." ' This begs
the question whether Congress could amend § 404(a) to state that the Corps can
assert jurisdiction over isolated wetlands pursuant to the terms of the Migratory
Bird Rule.
The dissent likely would have no problem with this." This faction of the
Courtmakes clear its beliefthatthe Migratory Bird Rule would pass constitutional
muster as an "activit[y] that 'substantially affect[s]' interstate commerce" under
the third prong ofLopez.m However, in doing so, these Justices rely on the Perez,
Hodel, and Wickard cases decided prior to the Court's retreat from the cumulative
effects test inLopez. They also note that the intrinsic value ofmigratory birds was
216. Riverside Bayview was an appeal from a restrictive decision holding that the
Corps could not assert jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland if it was not flooded by
adjacent waters at a sufficient frequency. Id. at 125. Solid Waste was an appeal from an
expansive decision holding that the Corps could assert jurisdiction over isolated waters
solely because of the presence of migratory birds. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 166.
217. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
218. Lower courts have had some difficulty drawing this line and have expressed
different views of Solid Waste's precedential authority. Compare United States v.
Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (N.D. M. 200 1) C'1SWAACC does indicate, though, that
wetlands likely need to have a substantial connection to interstate commerce or a
connection to navigable waters (in the traditional sense) in order to be waters of the
United States that fall within the CWA term navigable waters.'), with United States v.
Interstate Gem Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (D. Md. 2001) ("The SWANCC case was
a narrow holding dealing with the Migratory Bird Rule and 33 CFR § 328(3)(a)(3).").
219. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172.
220. Id. at 174.
221. Id. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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recognize inHolland. The reliance onHollandmaybe misplaced as Holland
dealt with the treaty power and never discussed whether Congress could protect
migratory birds -under the Commerce Clause.m However, Hollandwas decided
well before the Court adopted the cumulative effects test in Jones & Laughlin, and
an expansive reading of the cumulative effects test could support its holding.
While the majority did not definitively rule on whether Congress could enact
a Migratory Bird Rule, it likely would not approve of such legislation. The
majority emphasized that, although the Commerce Clause is broad, it is limited,
and, pursuant to the third prong of Lopez, them must be an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.' However, the Migratory Bird Rule
does not identify clearly a commercial object or activity "that, in the aggregate,
substantially effects interstate commerce." Further, the majority expressed
concemthat asserting jurisdiction over isolated wetlands under the MigratoryBird
Rule "would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and
primary power over land and water use."' m One of the Justices in the majority
already has indicated that he had doubts about whether there was a "sufficient
nexus with interstate commerce" to support the Migratory Bird Rule.
A statute protecting the habitat of migratory birds might be upheld if it is
passed as awildlifeprotectionmeasure. Even afterLopez, wildlifeprotection acts
have been upheld by circuit courts as valid regulations of interstate commerce,
After Morrison, which focused on the economic nature of the activity being
regulated, there was some question whether wildlife protection acts would survive
constitutional challenge." However, the Courtrecentlypassed onthe opportunity
to consider the constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act by denying
certiorari in Gibbs v. Norton." This action mayindicate that the Court is, for the
223. Id. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. Missouriv. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920).
225. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 174.
228. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 957 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
229. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
230. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 507 (4th Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the killing of all red wolves living on private property in North Carolina
would not constitute economic activity as required in Morrison, and, therefore, the
majority's use of aggregationwas impermissible), cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 121 S.
Ct. 1081 (2001).
231. 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001). Hadthe Court granted certiorari, itwouldhave created
a conflict of interest problem for Solicitor General Theodore B. Olsen. Prior to being
appointed SolicitorGeneralbyPresidentBush, Olsenrepresented Gibbs beforetheFourth
Circuit David G. Savage, The Next Federalism Frontier, A.B.A J., April 2001, at 30,
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moment, no longer interested in further restraining the federal power over the
environment. 32 However, it also may be an indication that the Court intends to
defer to long-standing statutes while striking down administrative interpretations
of those statutes.
The Court's decision not to rule on the Commerce Clause issue has provided
some relief for civil rights activists concerned that the case might further
undermine the cumulative effects test. 33 More than ten civil rights groups filed an
amicus brief." 4 Although the groups acknowledged that the case did not directly
involve civil rights, if the Court further retreated from the cumulative effects test
and the aggregation theory, the decision could "cast apall" on civil rights laws and
hate crime legislation. 5 These concerns are still prevalent because, although the
Court did not reach the Commerce Clause question, its recognition of the serious
and significant constitutional problems of the Corps's argument emphasizes the
vitality of the Lopez approach. 6 As mentioned earlier, the Court is not likely to
turn away from long-standing precedents, such as Katzenbach v. McClunge7 and
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,"3 which are not in danger of being
overturned. However, more recent legislation that pushes at the edges of the
Commerce Clause may be at risk 39
32.
232. Id. The Supreme Courthas heldthatthe"denial ofa writ ofcertiorari imports
no expression of opinion upon the merits ofthe case." United States v. Carver, 260 U.S.
482, 490 (1923) (opinion by Justice Holmes); accord Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 366 n. 1 (1973); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97
(1953). A "variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ," Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917 (1950) (opinion by Justice Frankfurter), making it
difficult to give denials of certiorari any precedential value. It is noteworthy, however,
that ifthe Court desired to extend Solid Waste's holding to the Endangered Species Act,
Gibbs would have provided the opportunity to do so.
233. Jeffrey Ghannam, Serving up Civil Rights, at




237. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
238. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
239. The Supreme Court has shown reluctance to overturn cases and laws that are
longstanding and have become part of the "national culture." See Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) CMiranda has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.");
Mitchellv. United States, 526 U.S. 314,331-32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('[Tiheno-
adverse-inference rule has found 'wide acceptance in the legal culture' ... which is
adequate reason not to overrule these cases, a course I in no waypropose."). Solid Waste
followed this general approach when it struck down the Corps's 1986 Migratory Bird
[Vol. 66
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army
Corps ofEngineers, the Supreme Court considered whether the Army Corps of
Engineers could assertfederal jurisdiction over an abandoned strip mine that over
the years, had become a series ofponds. A sharply divided Court held that, when
Congress passed § 404(a) of the CWA, it did not intend the Corps's jurisdiction
to stretch that far. By deciding the case as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
Court avoided the highly sensitive Commerce Clause issue. However, the
dissenting opinion and the dicta in the majority opinion indicate that the Court is
split on this issue, as well. The majority's dicta indicate that the Court is
committed to the narrower Commerce Clause interpretation established in Lopez
andreaffirmedinMorrison. Moreover, the majorityhas provided anew argument
forthose seeking to restrictthe reach offederal regulations: "Attoreys can argue
either that a statute is unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress's
commerce power or that the court should construe the law as inapplicable so as to
avoid constitutionalissues."'UO The Rehnquist Courthas indicated its commitment
to Lopez. One thing is certain: rough waters lay ahead for Commerce Clause
regulations.
WLUAmm F. NoRTBRip
Rule while preserving the CWA. See supranotes 152-64 and accompanying test Lopez
andMorrison are also inlinewiththis approach. The GunFree School Zones Act, struck
downin Lopez, was passed in 1990. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995).
The ViolenceAgainst WomenAct, consideredinM orrison, was enacted in 1994. United
States v. Monison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000).
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